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THE NEW RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
CRITICAL CONCERNS FOR IDAHO LAWYERS
Donald L. Burnett, Jr.
They started slowly. But state by state, with increasing momentum,
the new Rules of Professional Conduct are displacing the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.1 Idaho has joined the movement. Effective
November 1, 1986, by order of our Supreme Court, lawyers in this state
will be governed by the "Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct." The
Rules are patterned substantially after the model adopted by the
American Bar Association. This article traces the evolution of the new
Idaho Rules, summarizes differences between the Rules and the prior
Code, and identifies salient issues now facing Idaho practitioners.
Back to the Future: A Glimpse of History
In 1836, Baltimore practitioner David Hoffman published "Fifty Resolu-
tions" containing standards of lawyer behavior. Two decades later, in
1854, George Sharswood, Dean of the University of Pennslyvania Law
School and eventual Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
delivered a series of lectures on legal ethics. These lectures evolved
into Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar
Association in 1887. The Canons, in turn, were adopted with modifica-
tions by the American Bar Association in 1908.
The Canons contained aspirational statements about lawyers and law
practice. By the 1960's, aspirations alone had proven unsatisfactory as
tools to regulate lawyer conduct. The Canons suffered from excess
generality and ambiguity, causing Stanford Professor Anthony G. Amster-
dam to opine that they provided lawyers with as much useful guidance
in their work as a valentine would furnish a heart surgeon.2
In 1964, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr., now known to us as
Justice Powell, appointed a special committee to develop standards
"capable of enforcement." 3 Powell's Committee on Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards wrote the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Code was approved by the ABA House of Delegates In 1970 and soon
was adopted by jurisdictions throughout the United States. In an effort
to improve enforcement of ethical standards, the Code coupled "Ethical
Considerations" (EC's) with "Disciplinary Rules" (DR's). The DR's set
forth grounds to impose sanctions for professional misconduct. The EC's,
retaining the flavor of the former Canons, were described in the Code
as "aspirational in character. [They] represent the objectivf'. toward
which every member of the profession should strive... "
The Code had been in existence only a few years when a movement
began to modify or to abolish it. The Code's schizoid presentation of
DR's and EC's created confusion as to what was enforceable and what
was not. Some states, like Idaho, arguably compounded the problem
by adopting the DR's without the EC's. Moreover, neither the DR's nor
the EC's covered many practical questions encountered in the prac-
tice of law. These questions were addressed by "ethics opinions" of
the ABA and of the adopting jurisdictions. The opinions varied con-
siderably In content, quality and accessibility.
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In 1977 the ABA created another committee, the Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards. This body came to be known as
the "Kutak Commission," in honor of its chairman, the late Robert J.
Kutak, a lawyer from Omaha, Nebraska. During 1980 and 1981, the
Kutak Commission issued a "discussion draft," followed by a "tentative
draft," of proposed new Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1981
the Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar created a Professional Con-
duct Standards Committee, charging it to examine these drafts and to
offer suggestions for improvement before final action was taken by the
ABA House of Delegates. The Standards Committee - consisting of
lawyers, non-lawyers, judges and faculty from the University of Idaho
College of Law - submitted its report in 1982. The Commissioners for-
warded the report to the ABA. As a result of suggestions from Idaho
and other states, the ABA prepared a revised "final draft" in 1982. That
draft was adopted, with further amendments, by the ABA House of
Delegates in 1983.
In 1984 the Idaho Bar Commissioners, with the help of a second com-
mittee, studied the ABA's Model Rules. The Commissioners endorsed
the Model Rules with some modifications and submitted them to the
bar membership as part of the annual resolution process in 1985. The
modified rules were adopted and submitted to the Idaho Supreme Court.
On June 9, 1986, the Court approved the Idaho Rules "in principle."
On September 3, after revising a rule on confidentiality as discussed
more fully below, the Court adopted the new Rules. As noted earlier,
the Rules carry an effective date of November 1, 1986.
For reasons not stated, the Supreme Court stopped short of adopting
official comments to the Rules. However, the Idaho State Bar has
published the comments as aids to interpretation. Idaho lawyers will find
most of the comments helpful and authoritative. Indeed, during the long
process of debate and compromise - both in the ABA and in Idaho
- accommodations were reached by balancing the black letter of the
Rules with the explanatory text of the comments.
As the Rules evolved, they came to differ from the prior Code in tlhree
fundamental respects. First, the structure is different. The Code was
organized around broad statements of ethical aspirations carried over
from the old Canons of Ethics. In contrast, the Rules are organized by
specific professional functions and relationships - e.g., the lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer as a counselor, the lawyer as an advocate, etc.
This structure now pervades the current literature on professional
standards.
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The second fundamental difference lies in substantive content. The
Rules explicitly provide - whereas the Code scarcely recognized -
that modern lawyers are not one-dimensional representatives of their
clients. They are officers of the legal system and public citizens with
special responsibilities for the fair resolution of disputes and the effec-
tive administration of justice. The Rules acknowledge that many ethical
problems arise not from dishonesty but from the conflicting demands
placed upon lawyers by these competing roles. The Rules laudably
undertake to resolve such conflicts by striking balances or assigning
priorities among the role requirements. Although the Rules may ac-
complish this daunting task imperfectly, they still i5rovide more com-
prehensive and useful guidance than the Code.
The third difference relates to enforcement. The proposed Rules define
minimum acceptable behavior. They are not aspirational. As one
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distinguished commentator has noted:
The Model Rules... represent the culmination of a historical pro-
cess that began a century and a half ago: the shift from articulating
professional standards, suffused with Ideas of morality and ethics,
and enforced if at all by informal sanctions and peer pressure,
to enacting comprehensive and explicit legislation attended by
formally Imposed sanctions for breach.5
Some might say this is a melancholy comment on the legal profession.
It signifies that lawyers are not unique; they, like everyone else, need
specific rules rather than lofty goals to guide their behavior. Others would
say that the new Rules are realistic in this regard and may be more ef-
fective in producing ethical conduct than were its aspirational
predecessors.
Who's Rules Apply? The Threshold Problem of Jurisdiction
The Rules undertake not only to address the competing roles that
lawyers perform but also to prescribe a method for determining what
standards govern a lawyer whose practice spills over state boundaries.
This problem has become increasingly Important as the interstate prac-
tice of law has grown. The problem has been exacerbated by recent
efforts of federal courts, and even federal agencies, to regulate lawyer
conduct.
Rule 8.5 is disarmingly straightforward. It simply states, "A lawyer
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction Is subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere."
The Rule provides for concurrent jurisdiction of disciplinary authorities.
This approach Is not free from difficulty. Suppose a Pocatello lawyer
represents several Utah clients. An ethical question arises. The Idaho
and Utah standards differ. How shall the lawyer proceed? Or suppose
that an Air Force JAG officer at Mountain Home represents an Idaho
serviceman. The Idaho standards conflict with legal assistance regula-
tions promulgated by the Air Force. What should the JAG offIcer do?
Rule 8.5's adoption of concurrent jurisdiction genuflects toward
pluralism among the states and toward comity between the states and
the federal government. The official comment to Rule 8.5 observes:
If the Rules of Professional Conduct in ... two jurisdictions dif-
fer, principles of conflict of laws may apply ... [T]he general
authority of the states to regulate the practice of law must be
reconciled with such authority as federal tribunals may have to
regulate practice before them.
The Rule and its comment may Invite criticism for begging the ques-
tion of how a lawyer should conduct his or her practice when faced with
inconsistent standards. The reference to "principles of conflict of laws"
simply tells the lawyer to make an educated guess at which of the jurisdic-
tional authorities has the "most significant relationship" to him and his
conduct.* Similarly, a lawyer subject to federal standards must deter-
mine whether the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that
it displaces state standards through the preemption doctrine.?
But Disraeli's famous admonition comes to mind: "It is much easier
to be critical than to be correct," The problems inherent in concurrent
jurisdiction were well known to drafters of the ABA's Model Rules. The
same problems had existed, at least in concept, under the prior Code.
Concurrent jurisdiction appeared to be the least troublesome way to
reconcile diverse views on standards for lawyers and the diverse mix
of sovereign entities empowered to Impose such standards. As lawyers
occasionally must explain to their clients, uncertainty Is a price we pay
for creative tensions generated by our federal system. Caution due to
uncertainty will be the watchword of cross-jurisdictional law practice In
the future.
Rules In Controversy: Standards Relating to
Confidentiality, Conflicts and Organizations
Assuming that a lawyer determines that his or her conduct will be
governed In Idaho, the next task is to identify the applicable standard.
Here, the news Is good. The Idaho Rules will provide readier and more
practical guidance than did the prior Code. But this does not mean that
the guidance will be free from controversy. Several of the most impor-
tant Rules deal with subjects of great sensitivity for lawyers: confiden-
tiality, conflict of interest, and the needs of organizational clients.
Confidentiality. At common law, as well as by statute and modern
court rules, communications between lawyer and client have been
treated as privileged.$ From this evidentiary doctrine has grown a cor-
ollary that the lawyer, as the client's representative, is required to main-
tain the confidentiality of all communications, disclosing only what the
client expressly or impliedly authorizes. However, as an officer of the
legal system and as a public citizen, the lawyer also has a separate du-
ty to prevent perjury, fraud or other harm. How should this tension be
resolved?
Three broad approaches to the choice of values between client
confidentiality and third-party and other social interests are discer-
nible. First, confidentiality could be raised from doctrine to over-
riding principle, such that a lawyer would always be required to
protect a client's interests regardless of impacts on third parties.
That would treat the values of confidentiality and the adversary
system as absolutes and would require defense of the implied
proposition that their social or other values are uniformly superior
to those of competing interests and proposed resolutions. Se-
cond, and conversely, third-party and other social interests could
be made predominant, so that interests of client confidentiality
and loyalty would have to yield uniformly in instances of client
wrongdoing. A third, much more complex approach would be to
develop criteria or categories that attempt to differentiate in-
stances in which either client interests or public interests are to
be given preference. To a large extent, the variegated treatment
of disclosure problems in the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model
Rules reflects such a sophisticated approach.9
What does "variegated treatment" mean In the real world? Suppose
a client insists on perjuring himself, undertakes a fraud, or threatens
physical harm to someone else. What should the lawyer do? As to per-
jury or fraud, the prior Code furnished little help. DR 7-102(A) stated
that the lawyer could not "knowingly use perjured testimony or false
evidence." The same DR required the lawyer to reveal a "perpetrated"
fraud (saying nothing about a contemplated future fraud). What guidance
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DR 7-102(A) gave, DR's 4-101(B) and (C) appeared to take away. They
declared that a lawyer's right to make corrective disclosures did not ex-
tend to "confidences" of the client. "Confidences," as opposed to
"secrets," were broadly defined as all communications protected by
the lawyer-client privilege. As to other kinds of harm, DR 4-101(C)(3)
stated that a lawyer "may" reveal the client's intent "to commit a crime,
and the information necessary to prevent the crime." This disclosure
apparently was not subject to the "confidences" exception of DR's
4-101(B) and (C).
The Code was criticized for its overlapping provisions and for am-
biguities lurking in the terms "secrets," "confidences" and "crimes."
Lawyers also complained that flatly prohibiting the use of perjury failed
to take account of how difficult it is for counsel to ascertain whether pro-
ffered testimony is really false. To remedy these problems, the ABA pro-
posed in its Model Rules to abolish any distinction among "secrets,"
"confidences" and other communications. Broadly speaking, the ABA's
Rule 1.6 undertook to protect from disclosure any information relating
to the lawyer's representation of the client, except as the client might
authorize. Model Rule 3.3 qualified this sweeping proposition by pro-
viding that a lawyer "shall" refuse to offer evidence he "knows" to be
false and that the lawyer "may" refuse to offer evidence he "reasonably
believes" to be false. Model Rule 1.6 contained a further exception. It
narrowed the permissive disclosure of crimes by providing that a lawyer
could reveal information to prevent the client from committing "a criminal
act" only if the lawyer believed the act was "likely to result In imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." The ABA Model Rules contained no
exception to confidentiality for fraud or nonphysical harm; consequently,
such disclosure without the client's consent was prohibited.
Although the ABA Rules seemed clearer than the Code, not everyone
agreed with the clarification. The provision in Rule 3.3 concerning false
evidence was criticized as going too far, or as not going far enough,
in preventing perjury. However, the United States Supreme Court, in
Nix v. Whiteslde, 10 may have muted some criticism about going too far.
The Court there held that a criminal defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel does not oblige the lawyer to cooperate in pre-
senting perjured testimony. Thus any concern that Rule 3.3 would con-
flict with a constitutional right in criminal cases seems to have been
alleviated. Idaho's new Rule 3.3 conforms to the ABA model.
The subjects of fraud and physical harm, addressed in ABA Model
Rule 1.6, generated louder debate. In 1980 the Kutak Commission's
"discussion draft" would have required disclosure to prevent criminal
acts likely to result in death or serious physical harm, and would have
allowed disclosure to prevent fraud or other nonphysical harm. In 1961
the "tentative draft" was watered down to provide that both kinds of
disclosure merely would be allowed. In 1982, the Idaho Standards Com-
mittee expressed a preference for the 1980 version, arguing that threats
of death or serious physical harm should be mandatorily disclosed.
Nevertheless, some national organizations of general practitioners and
trial lawyers leaned the opposite direction. They felt that even the 1981
version encroached too much upon client confidentiality. They urged
that disclosures relating to death or serious physical harm merely be
allowed and that disclosures of fraud and of criminal acts against pro-
perty or financial interests be prohibited. After a close and sharply divided
vote, the ABA House of Delegates ultimately adopted this position in
1983.
Back in Idaho, the Bar Commissioners proposed that Rule 1.6 be re-
vised by allowing disclosures relating not only to death or serious physical
harm but also to fraud. During the resolution process in 1985, this ver-
sion of Rule 1.6 passed six of the seven districts but met opposition
from the Boise Bar Association. The Boise Bar opposed it not because
it had been watered down from the 1980 Kutak draft, but because it
allegedly still went too far In the direction of disclosure. The Boise Bar
voted to amend the proposed Rule by prohibiting the disclosure of
fraudulent acts. The district bar presidents later adopted this amend-
ment, bringing the proposed Rule into conformity with the ABA model.
When the resolution embodying the new Rules was transmitted to our
Supreme Court, the turbulent history of Rule 1.6 disclosed a full range
of options. The Court could have chosen (a) mandatory disclosure of
threatened death or serious physical harm, as well as fraud and other
kinds of nonphysical harm. It could have elected (b) permissive disclosure
of fraud and nonphysical harm but mandatory disclosure of physical
harm, as provided In the 1980 Kutak draft and as favored by the Idaho
Standards Committee. It could have opted for (c) permissive disclosure
of all kinds of harm. It could have chosen (d) permissive disclosure of
threatened death or serious physical harm but no other disclosure, as
adopted by the House of Delegates and ultimately by the Idaho State
Bar. Finally, it could have (e) prohibited disclosure of any kind without
the client's consent. The Court ultimately chose a variation on alternative
(c). The Court revived the provision in the prior Code that a lawyer "may"
disclose such Information as he or she "reasonably believes
necessary... to prevent the client from committing a crime, including
disclosure of the intention of his client to commit a crime . . . " Thus,
the Court accepted the ABA's abolition of "secrets" and "confidences,"
but It retained the prior Code's use of the word "may" (as had the ABA
model). It also retained the Code's use of "crimes" as the broad criterion
for permissive disclosure.
Conflicts and Imputed disqualification. Rules prohibiting conflicts
of interest arise from two fundamental principles in lawyer-client rela-
tionships: confidentiality and loyalty. The prior Code provided, in DR's
5-101(A) and 5-105(C), that a lawyer could not accept employment if
the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of the client was
reasonably likely to be adversely affected by differing interests of other
clients or by the lawyer's own personal interests - unless the client
consented after full disclosure. The ABA's Model Rule 1.7, now adopted
in Idaho, strengthens the safeguard against conflicting Interests by re-
quiring the client to give his consent after full disclosure and by further
requiring that the lawyer "reasonably" believe the client's interests will
not be adversely affected. The client's informed consent no longer
suffices.
The principle of loyalty carries over to the problem of imputed dis-
qualification. Suppose two or mcre lawyers practice together. Their
respective clients become entangled In a legal dispute. Under the prior
Code the lawyers - with proper disclosure and consent - could have
represented their clients In the dispute. Although this standard made
sense to lawyers, it made the world uneasy. As one commentator stated,
"Lawyers practicing together are in a poor position to give the world
assurance that one lawyer is not for many purposes the alter ego of
the other. Ties of friendship and finance and ready access to each other's
files unite their efforts and Interests ...-I
Accordingly, the ABA's Model Rule 1.10 draws a "bright line":
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall know-
Ingly represent a client when any one of them praciticing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by [rules relating to general
conflict of interest, prohibited transactions, former clients or func-
tioning as an intermediary],
Idaho has adopted this Rule. It embodies a judgment that conflicts of
interest in group law practices are best resolved by a blanket standard
of imputed disqualification. Idaho lawyers in group practice no longer
can rely on disclosure and consent to resolve conflict problems within
the firm. They must search their professional souls and determine
whether a client's interests are adversely affected by continued represen-
tation on the matter in controversy.
Organizational clients. The paradigm lawyer-client relationship ex-
ists between two individuals. But the face of law practice is changing
rapidly. A recent survey has indicated that approximately two-thirds of
all lawyers work within organizations of some sort, and they perform
the bulk of their services for entities rather than individuals.12
In a substantial amount of legal practice, "the client" is not the
"person with a problem" traditionally depicted in legal literature,
but an organization with indeterminate or potentially conflicting
interests. So too, the attorney often is not an independent moral
agent but an employee with circumscribed responsibility,
organizational loyalty, and attenuated client contact.13
The prior Code did not contain, in its DR's, a standard governing the
conduct of a lawyer toward an organizational client. However, EC 5-18
stated that a "lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar
entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a. .. person connected
with the entity." The ABA's new Model Rule 1.13, adopted In Idaho,
explicitly deals with organizational clients, reemphasizing the basic
precept that the lawyer's client is the entity itself.
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The critical question faced by lawyers representing entities Is what
to do If a person In authority within the organization acts, or intends to
act, contrary to the organization's legal Interests. Rule 1.13 provides
no single discrete answer. It offers guidelines, some of which narrow
the lawyer's ethical responsibility. The lawyer need concern himself with
the aberrant individual's conduct only if it relates to the subject matter
of the lawyer's representation of the entity. Moreover, the lawyer need
not act unless the Individual's conduct Is "a violation of a legal obliga-
tion to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might
be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial in-
jury to the organization..."
If these tests are satisfied, then the lawyer is directed to "proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best Interest of the organization." The
remedial measures a lawyer may undertake include requesting the in-
dividual to reconsider his conduct; advising. him to seek another legal
opinion; referring the matter to "higher authorlty" In the organization;
and, as a last resort, terminating the lawyer-client relationship with the
organization. Prominently omitted from this laundry list of permissible
remedies is "whistle blowing" - disclosure of information to outside
parties In order to prevent the individual from harming the organization.
Authority to blow the whistle was contained in the Kutak Committee's
1980, 1981 and 1982 drafts; but it was excised, and the reference to
resignation was inserted, after heated debate in the ABA's House of
Delegates. The Idaho Rule now reflects this outcome.
Calmer Seas: An Overview of Other Rules
Not all of the new Rules are burdened with controversy. As a result
of laborious drafting and redrafting from 1977 to 1983, the ABA suc-
ceeded in fashioning a consensus on most provisions of the Rules. Many
early problems, Including several noted by the Idaho Standards Com-
mittee, were resolved. Except as noted above, the Rules did not generate
substantial controversy among Idaho practitioners during the resolution
process. The remaining Rules, surveyed below, provide much-needed
clarifications regarding the scope of a lawyer's duties in various contexts.
The Lawyer-Client Relationship (Rules 1.1-1.16). Rule 1.1 makes
competency an affirmative requirement. The Code expressed a negative
approach, prohibiting lawyei3 to accept cases beyond their competency.
Rule 1.2 clarifies a client's right to make decisions that bind the lawyer;
the Code contained no counterpart provision. Rule 1.3 makes diligence
an affirmative obligation; the Code simply prohibited "neglect." Rule
1.4 commands the lawyer to keep the client informed; the Code con-
tained no explicit correlative provision.
Rule 1.5 mandates that fees be reasonable. It outlines criterin of
reasonableness consistent with I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and It expresses a
preference for written fee agreements with new clients. The Code merely
prohibited charging an "illegal or clearly excessive fee."
Rules 1.6 ("Confidentiality of Information"), 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest:
General Rule") and 1.10 ('h-.ued Disqualification: General Rule") are
discussed above. Rules 1.8 and 1.9 deal with conflicts arising from
business transactions between a lawyer and a client, and with conflicts
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Rules 1.11 and 1.12 prescribe safeguards for career transitions among
private practice, government service and the judiciary, in order to
minimize potential conflicts. The Code provided a less comprehensive
set of safeguards.
Rule 1.13 ("Organization as Client") Is discussed above. Rule 1.14
deals with disabled clients, a subject not addressed by the prior Code.
Rule 1.15 prescribes a lawyer's duties in safekeeping the client's pro-
perty. It mandates a separate trust account. This requirement was im-
plicit, rather than explicit, in the Code.
Rule 1.16 deals with termination of the lawyer-client relationship. Its
provisions go beyond prior Code requirements. If an Idaho lawyer seeks
to withdraw from representation of a client In litigation, he should also
consult I.R.C.P. 11(b)(2).
The Lawyer as Counselor (Rules 2.1-2.3). These rules elaborate
a lawyer's duty to exercise Independent professional judgment In
representing a client. They also authorize a lawyer, in certain situations,
to act as an intermediary between clients or to provide evaluations of
client matters for use by third parties. These rules recognize the ex-
panded scope of services demanded of lawyers by the public. The rules
have no direct counterparts in the Code.
The Lawyer as Advocate (Rules 3.1-3.9). Rule 3.1 prohibits lawyers
to assert frivolous claims or contentions. It requires advocacy to be based
upon the law or upon "a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law." However, it recognizes the right of a
criminal defense lawyer to put the government to its proof on all material
elements of an alleged offense. This rule Is more affirmative in tone than
its prior Code counterpart, which simply prohibited lawyers from ad-
vocating positions that would serve "merely to harass or maliciously
injure another."
Idaho lawyers also should be aware of I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1), which pro-
vides that an attorney signing a pleading, motion or other paper implicitly
warrants "that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded In fact and Is warranted by ex-
isting law or good faith argument for the extension, modification, or rever-
sal of existing law, and that it is not Interposed for any improper pur-
pose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation." A court may order sanctions for a viola-
tion of Rule 11(a)(1). Moreover, attorney fees may be awarded to a
prevailing party in litigation if the opposing party is found to have brought
or pursued a claim or defense frivolously, unreasonably or without foun-
dation. I.C. § 12-121; I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).
Rule 3.2 requires lawyers to "make reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client." The rule has a
sharper meaning than its Code counterpart, which broadly said that a
lawyer should be "punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments."
Rule 3.3 details the requirement of candor toward a tribunal. It Is men-
tioned in the discussion of client perjury elsewhere in this article. Rules
3.4-3.6 prescribe appropriate conduct toward an opposing party and
counsel, toward a court or tribunal, and toward the news media. These
provisions are more detailed and comprehensive than correlative sec-
tions of the Code.
Rules 3.7 and 3.8 govern conduct of the lawyer as a witness in litiga-
tion, as the prosecutor in a criminal case, and as an advocate in
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legislative or administrative proceedings. Similar but more cursory pro-
visions appeared in the Code.
Transactions with Persons Other than Clients (Rules 4.1-4.4).
These rules gather together In a convenient place various ethical stan-
dards pcrtaining to truthfulness in statements to others, communica-
tions with persons represented by counsel, special precautions in dealing
with unrepresented persons, and respect for the rights of third parties.
Similar provisions were scattered generically throughout the Code.
Law Firms and Associations (Rules 5.1-5.6). These rules prescribe
a lawyer's responsibility toward colleagues in the profession and in the
same firm. They set forth the responsibilities of supervisory and subor-
dinate lawyers with respect to each other, the responsibilities of lawyers
regarding nonlawyer legal assistants, and a lawyer's duty to avoid pro-
fessional compensation arrangements that impinge upon his or her pro-
fessional independence. Most of these provisions have no direct counter-
parts in the Code.
Rules 5.5 and 5.6 prohibit lawyers to engage in practice where they
are not licensed, to assist others in the unauthorized practice of law,
or to participate in agreements that would limit a lawyer's right to prac-
tice after leaving a firm. The Code contained similar provisions.
Public Service (Rule 6.1-6.4). Rule 6.1 deals with pro bono publico
service. Although the 1980 Kutak discussion draft contained a mandatory
pro bono standard, the requirement was dropped before the Rule was
adopted by the ABA in 1983. The Rule now merely states that a lawyer
"should render public interest legal service." However, this seemingly
precatory language may have sharper teeth in Idaho than elsewhere.
The Idaho lawyer's oath, incorporating I.C. § 3-201, prohibits any lawyer,
for personal considerations, to decline representation of the "defenseless
or oppressed."
Rules 6.2-6.4 enunciate a lawyer's duty to accept appointments by
courts or other tribunals, the lawyer's right to participate in legal ser-
vice organizations, and the lawyer's right to advocate legal reforms even
if client interests would be affected. The Code did not address these
subjects.
Information about Legal Services (Rules 7.1-7.4). Rule 7.1 permits
lawyer advertising so long as it does not contain misleading informa-
tion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. This section is more le-
nient than the corresponding provision in the ABA's prior Code, but it
is consistent with the Code as amended in Idaho during the 1970s.
Rule 7.2 identifies the appropriate media for advertising. It prohibits
paying others to recommend the lawyer to potential clients. These pro-
visions are more detailed than those found in the prior Code.
Rule 7.3 prohibits direct solicitation of prospective clients with whom
the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship. It is consis-
tent with the corresponding Code provision.
Rule 7.4 as adopted in Idaho, prohibits any advertisement that con-
tains a "designation of specialization." The prohibition is intended to
protect the public because Idaho does not now have a program to cer-
tify specialists. The prohibition is consistent with the prior Code and with
the ABA's Model Rule, which would allow designations of specializa-
tion only where certification programs exist.
Rule 7.5 ostensibly deals with the prosaic subject of "firm names and
letterheads." However, its real significance is that it allows interstate
practice under a single firm name, so long as the lawyers practicing
in each state actually are licensed there. This Rule encountered virtually
no resistance from Idaho lawyers during the resolution process.
Multistate practice now seems to be widely accepted.
Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession (Rules 8.1-8.5). These
rules define the responsibilities of lawyers, judges and bar applicants
in the regulatory system and in professional discipline. Rule 8.5, pro-
viding concurrent jurisdiction when lawyers practice in more than one
state, is discussed above.
Taken us a whole, the new Idaho Rules represent a consensus on
minImum standards of conduct in rapidly evolving areas of professional
responsibility. They are good standards; they are not perfect standards.
They illustrate the difficulty of distilling specific maxims of conduct from
general ethical principles. As the early Canons, the prior Code and the
new Rules show, this is the never-ending but ennobling task of a pro-
fession that takes ethics seriously and tries to bring its behavior closer
to its aspirations.
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ABA ANNOUNCES
LAW DAY THEME
The American Bar Association has announced the theme for Law Day
1987 is "We the People." Law Day U.S.A., celebrated annually on May
1, has been established to reserve a "special day of celebration by the
American people in appreciation of their liberties and to provide an oc-
casion for rededication to the ideals of equality and justice under laws."
A detailed planning guide and many promotional, education and in-
formational materials are available from the A.B.A. for groups planning
observance of Law Day. For further Information, contact Law Day U.S.A.,
American Bar Association, 8th Floor, 750 North Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, IL 60611, or phone 312/988-6134. 0
Idaho State Tax Institute Held
The 28th Annual Idaho State Tax Institute was held October 10-11
in Pocatello. The Institute was sponsored by the Idaho Law Founda-
tion, Idaho State University and the Idaho Society of Certified Public
Accountants.
One hundred fifty-nine participants attend.d workshops on a diversity
of tax-related subjects, and speakers received excellent ratings on their
presentations.
Plans are already underway for next year's seminar which will be held
Oct. 2-3, 1987, In conjunction with the U of I, ISU game. El
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